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During the course of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has faced challenges in 
treating wounded soldiers on a scale it hasn’t witnessed since the Vietnam War. In response, the 
military has succeeded in reducing the mortality rate of soldiers injured in combat through a radi-
cal shift in doctr ine, procedures and medical technology. The duration of the two wars has also 
produced a wealth of research that has informed Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), which 
has become the standardized set of procedures used to treat U.S. casualties across active-duty 
military services. Despite this, the cost has been high: 4,486 U.S. soldiers were killed in Iraq and 
more than 2,300 killed in Afghanistan. In the early years of the conf licts, the rate of preventable 
deaths was lit tle different from 30 years prior. But more than a decade later, a wounded soldier is 
much more likely to survive his or her injuries than in previous wars. 
Par tly, this is due to the duration of the conf licts. Advances in medical technology and battlefield 
care can be seen and studied over longer periods. Information technology has made it easier to 
track, treat and analyze injuries. Developments in neuroscience and prosthetics have also opened 
up new areas for long-term care, although the causes of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) remain elu-
sive and treatment is often poor. Meanwhile, military practices are being widely adopted in civil-
ian hospitals, by police and by first-responder paramedic teams, and institutions such as the U.S. 
Army Institute for Surgical Research have also driven a wave of research into treating traumatic 
injuries, to the benefit of civilian medical providers. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BATTLEFIELD TRAUMA CARE
In a battlefield environment, medics are expected to treat severe injuries with limited supplies in 
dusty, dir ty environments while also r isking being shot with bullets or wounded by shrapnel. This 
confusing and hazardous environment poses enormous challenges not regularly faced by civilian 
paramedics. Soldiers can sustain catastrophic injuries that can cause sudden death or life-long 
disability. Does the medic prioritize treating injuries or f ighting the enemy? When faced with 
multiple injuries, how does the medic prioritize which injuries to treat f irst? And how does the 
medic treat injuries when different types of treatment pose various other r isks?
The most important development in battlefield trauma care has been the creation of the set of 
doctr ines and procedures that comprise Tactical Combat Casualty Care. First developed beginning 
in 1994 by the U.S. special operations forces community, the goal was to detect the most easily 
preventable causes of battlefield deaths and train first responders to quickly stabilize such injuries 
when under fire. This also meant deferr ing care for injuries that, while stil l potentially lethal if 
left untreated, were survivable in the shor t term. In 1997, TCCC became the standard doctr ine for 
the Navy SEALs, and was mandated for the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment in 1998 by the regiment’s 
commanding officer, then-Col. Stanley McChrystal. In 2011, TCCC became the standardized set 
of combat medical procedures used across the U.S. armed forces.
First, TCCC prioritizes reducing casualties over treatment. If a unit comes under attack and one 
or more soldiers are wounded, the medic—and the injured, if possible—are tasked with returning 
BY ROBERT BECKHUSEN 
IMPROVING THE ODDS: 
BATTLEFIELD MEDICINE IN IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN
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fire to suppress the enemy and stop the attack, depending on the tactical situation. This serves to 
prevent the unit from incurring fur ther casualties, including injuries to medical personnel on the 
scene or those ar r iving by helicopter to treat and evacuate the wounded. Next the doctr ine calls on 
medics to employ aggressive use of tourniquets and hemostatic agents to control bleeding, a form 
of “damage control” that forgoes more complicated procedures, instead emphasizing procedures 
that are likely to save lives in the hour before the wounded can reach a hospital.
This was a marked change from how the U.S. military treated casualties early on in America’s 
21st-century wars. When the U.S. military first entered Afghanistan and Iraq, l it tle had changed in 
medical doctr ine since the Vietnam War. Aside from a select few commando units with experience 
in TCCC, such as the 75th Ranger Regiment—which saw a 3 percent casualty rate from potentially 
survivable wounds in 2001-2010 compared to 24 percent across the general armed forces—and 
Navy SEAL teams, the armed services did not train troops to use tourniquets, and in fact cautioned 
against their use. This has long been a point of controversy among doctors. A tourniquet cuts off 
the body’s blood supply to the wound, which reduces bleeding, but can also result in cut-off tis-
sue becoming oxygenated, which can possibly lead to cell death, nerve damage and amputations. 
Worse, clotting tissue can then spread to the bloodstream, potentially leading to shock and death. 
Prior to the implementation of the TCCC, tourniquets were widely thought to be a cure worse than 
the wound.
The r isks of tourniquets are real, par ticularly if applied improperly or applied after a wounded sol-
dier goes into shock. But as casualties mounted in Afghanistan and Iraq, a new consensus emerged 
that the r isks of using tourniquets had been overstated. A 2007 report by the U.S. Army Institute 
for Surgical Research studied 232 soldiers in Iraq who had tourniquets applied to wounds and 
found no link between tourniquets—if used correctly by trained personnel—and increased r isk of 
mortality. The institute’s conclusion was that tourniquets can save lives and that discouraging their 
use “in the current war will increase the death rate.” Since these revelations, the U.S. military has 
gone on to field more than 1 million Combat Application Tourniquets, which use a windlass to 
secure the band tightly around an extremity, and require only one hand to use. Another develop-
ment is the introduction to special operations forces units of a specialized tourniquet called the 
Combat Ready Clamp, which attaches like a vice to the groin region—an area difficult to stabilize 
with standard tourniquets.
The U.S. military has also improved upon several iterations of hemostatic dressings, which are 
medical bandages containing chemicals that promote blood clotting. These dressings can be effec-
tive when applied together with tourniquets, and in regions that are not amenable to tourniquets 
such as joints and armpits, which are frequent areas of combat wounds as they are not typically 
covered by body armor. In 2003, the military largely used fibrin sealant dressings that contained 
powdered fibrinogen and thrombin, which clotted wounds when pressed for two to three minutes. 
Over the next several years, the military par tnered with the American Red Cross to produce dress-
ings treated with chitosan, a chemical derived from shrimp. The U.S. military experimented with 
a hemostatic agent known as QuikClot, but this was withdrawn after concerns that the powder 
caused tissue burns and dissipated before forming a clot. Since 2008, the U.S. Army Institute of 
Surgical Research has recommended Combat Gauze, a dressing coated in kaolin, a type of clay that 
uses aluminosilicate nanopar ticles to stimulate clotting. It does not have any known side effects.
Another advance has been in treating hypothermia. Cold weather in Afghanistan’s mountains is a 
common cause, but hypothermia can also be hastened by injecting cold intravenous f luids to sta-
bilize wounded troops. The U.S. military has encouraged some makeshift alternatives, including 
insulating intravenous tubes using bits of cloth, covering the tubes in a sleeping bag together with 
the patient or storing the f luids close to the body, keeping them warm. Furthermore, soldiers now 
carry chemically heated blankets and hoods known as Hypothermia Prevention and Management Kits.
A related development was the establishment of the Department of Defense Trauma Registry. This 
database, created in 2005, established a single system for tracking wounded soldiers and the type 
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of treatment they receive once they arr ive at f ield hospitals. Such data continues to be tracked 
as the soldiers are moved to more-advanced treatment facilities in the United States. This gave 
Pentagon planners access to large amounts of data regarding which treatments were successful, 
data they then used as the basis for recommendations to the U.S. military’s Center for Tactical 
Combat Casualty Care. The program was later extended to include the Pre-Hospital Trauma Reg-
istry Initiative, which tracks treatment given at the tactical level. As par t of the initiative, soldiers 
are issued a card, and if a solider is injured, the field medic can write down the type of treatment 
given before the casualty is evacuated. This essentially takes the military’s practice of recording 
lessons learned from combat in the form of After Action Reports and applies it to casualties.
DEVELOPMENTS IN FORWARD-DEPLOYED HOSPITAL CARE
Another series of improvements have occurred at in-theater hospitals and, to a lesser extent, dur-
ing medevac f lights from the battlefield to the hospital. 
In general, military medical evacuations during the wars compare poorly to their civilian coun-
terpar ts. U.S. Army medevac UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-47 Chinook helicopters have commonly 
carr ied a single medic responsible for treating seriously injured patients while traveling over long 
distances. By contrast, civilian helicopters often have two paramedics who are better trained and 
equipped than their military counterpar ts. According to a 2012 study in the Journal of Trauma and 
Acute Care Surgery, the military version “remains essentially unchanged since the Vietnam era” 
despite evidence showing that experiments with medevac units trained along civilian lines reduced 
48-hour mortality rates by 7 percent. However, the Pentagon has mandated all f l ight medics to 
be trained to civilian paramedic standards by 2017. Medical evacuations have also become more 
efficient. In 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates surged helicopters into Afghanistan 
to ensure that soldiers could make it to field hospitals within the “golden hour”—the hour after 
sustaining an injury in which, if treated, the patient is l ikely to survive. This decision is widely 
credited with saving lives.
The military has been more innovative at f ield hospitals. One of the most serious issues facing 
wounded troops is coagulopathy, a complex condition that prevents blood from clotting. According 
to the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery, a quar ter of combat casualties with severe bleed-
ing experience the condition, with a mortality rate up to 50 percent if treated with conventional 
methods. In response, the military has reduced the mortality rate of the wounded to 19 percent 
by injecting casualties with equal ratios of red blood cells, frozen plasma and platelets. This has 
meant forgoing substitutes such as cryoprecipitate, which can cause side effects including transfu-
sion-related acute lung injury, which is potentially lethal. Military hospitals also now commonly 
use tranexamic acid (TXA), which is used to control bleeding during intensive surgeries. Used in 
civilian hospitals for decades, TXA was introduced to Afghanistan by British forces before enter-
ing regular service with U.S. forces.
Moreover, the U.S. has fielded medical-imaging CT machines at the Role 3 Multinational Medical 
Unit in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the most advanced military medical facility in that country. Prior 
to the introduction of CT scans at higher-echelon hospitals, the Pentagon mandated that surgeons 
conduct invasive exploratory surgeries to discover shrapnel embedded by explosive blasts. That 
mandate has since been dropped, which also eliminates the need for the now-unnecessary surger-
ies, reducing the r isk of fatal complications. The military has also deployed teams of specialized 
vascular trauma surgeons—first introduced to in-theater hospitals in the past decade—in response 
to data collected in the DOD Trauma Registry that revealed injuries to veins and ar ter ies were 
much more common than in previous wars.
One serious form of injury frequently seen in military casualties is severe burns. These are com-
monly caused by explosive attacks on vehicles. A serious and potentially fatal complication occurs 
when burn casualties are given too much saline f luid during resuscitation, which can cause pulmo-
nary edema and respiratory failure. This is also a common problem in the civilian world. In recent 
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years, the military has tr ied to reduce this r isk with a set of procedures adopted from civilian 
hospitals known as the Rule of 10 and by recording the types and amounts of f luids administered, 
which was not regularly done during the early years of the wars. Severe burns can also lead to kid-
ney failure. Forward-deployed hospitals had few ways of treating this condition until 2005, when 
the military began using a therapy known as continuous venovenous hemofiltration, a shor t-term 
emergency dialysis treatment, until the patient could be f lown out of the country.
PROSPECTS AND SHORTFALLS FOR LONG-TERM CARE
However, despite these advances in battlefield care, the military’s record for long-term care is mixed. 
Prosthetic legs have improved significantly in the past decade, essentially becoming computerized 
limbs. At least 2,000 U.S. service members have lost l imbs in America’s two wars. Many of these 
veterans now use advanced prosthetics that include built-in gyroscopes and accelerometers that 
can mimic leg muscles and adapt to changes in elevation. The limbs have also become lighter, 
thanks to the use of carbon fiber structures as opposed to wood, which was used in prosthetics 
during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the more advanced prosthetic limbs on the market 
such as the Otto Bock X-series—which began as a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) program—can be exceedingly expensive, at a cost of up to $100,000. Some components, 
such as a knee with gyroscope and accelerometer, are commonly purchased separately to augment 
an existing prosthetic leg.
It’s l ikely these advances will continue in the years ahead. DARPA is currently researching a pro-
gram named Reliable Neural-Interface Technology, which aims to connect nerves in an amputated 
limb to an interface, potentially allowing a veteran to manipulate a prosthetic arm using brain sig-
nals. Several prototypes are being used in military hospitals and include sensors in the finger tips 
interfaced with the patient’s nervous system, which allows the patient to have limited sensations, 
including feeling heat. However, it’s unclear if the interface will be able to perform well over a 
period of several years—a problem that has plagued previous DARPA prosthetics experiments. 
The military has also struggled heavily with treating a surge of traumatic brain injuries. The wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an estimated 200,000 brain injuries, often caused by 
concussive blast waves from improvised explosive devices, grenades and controlled detonations. 
The Pentagon has also been beset by numerous, well-documented scandals including widespread 
neglect of soldiers with brain injuries at military hospitals, months-long delays before wounded 
soldiers can receive treatment and soldiers being misdiagnosed and denied treatment. Military 
hospitals can be poorly staffed, with soldiers diagnosed with mental i l lnesses tasked with oversee-
ing other patients. The military has established mandatory TBI screening programs in the hope of 
detecting cases, but many cases will l ikely never be adequately diagnosed and treated. Investiga-
tions of the military’s screening programs have found that their success rate of spotting TBI is 
l it tle better than random chance.
The problem is compounded by the fact that a TBI may simply go unnoticed. It may take years for 
TBI symptoms to emerge, and these symptoms—including dizziness, nausea and headaches—can 
vary drastically from person to person. New research from the Duke University School of Medicine 
and the U.S. Depar tment of Veterans Affairs shows that soldiers who have been close to explosions 
can have discernible injuries to the brain without showing any symptoms. But the science of TBI is 
stil l poorly understood. Traumatic brain injury is believed to be a tr igger for post-traumatic stress 
disorder, which can cause symptoms such as major depression and rage. But the exact relationship 
is unclear. Worse, recognizing that problems with TBI are widespread could call soldiers away 
from the battlefield, something the military is reluctant to do.
In addition, thousands of veterans have reported chronic respiratory problems as the result of 
exposure to toxic par ticulates released from “burn pits”—or open-air incinerators—widely used 
to dispose of waste at bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon has closed many of these pits, 
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which have been used to burn everything from discarded clothes to plastic and medical waste. The 
vast majority of il lnesses caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals will also likely never be fully 
known, as the military did not keep records of the pits and what was burned in them until 2010.
A silver lining to the conf licts has been the spread of military trauma practices to the civilian 
world. The Pentagon sharply increased funding for trauma research during the wars, and military 
research institutions have collaborated heavily with their civilian counterpar ts. After the April 
15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombings, trauma treatment developed by the military was used to 
control bleeding experienced by blast victims. Instead of giving patients whole blood, which r isked 
exhausting the supply, surgeons treating the injured from that incident used a military-style mix of 
blood, plasma and platelets. The first responders also used tourniquets, again credited to the mili-
tary, which resulted in no deaths from hemorrhage. Hemostatic dressings pioneered by the military 
have become more common in civilian paramedic kits. Police first responders to the July 2012 
mass shooting in Aurora, Colo., had been recently equipped with tourniquets and military-style 
Combat Gauze, which was used to control bleeding of several victims. The new wave of advanced 
prosthetics is also not l imited to military amputees—civilians benefit as well. But TCCC cannot be 
applied evenly across the civilian medical community, as many aspects relate to treating injuries 
that are comparatively rare outside of battlefields.
Since its development, tactical care in the form of TCCC and its related technologies has improved 
the survival rate for wounded soldiers. The doctr ine was only mandated service-wide in 2011, 
however, and it’s important for the Pentagon to ensure military medical teams receive adequate 
training under this standard. As U.S. forces withdraw from Afghanistan, it’s also crucial to pre-
vent research into trauma from stagnating, as it did during the period after the Vietnam War. This 
will not only have benefits for civilian providers, but there will l ikely be a time after Afghanistan 
when U.S. and par tner forces will again be ordered into combat. When they are, they must receive 
the best possible treatment. □
Robert Beckhusen is a reporter and editor at War is Boring, the national security collection at 
Medium. He has also written for Wired, C4ISR Journal and other publications. You can f ind him 
on Twitter at @rbeckhusen.
Photo: Flight medics f rom Task Force Knighthawk during a training course, Kandahar, Afghani-
stan, Jan. 4, 2013 (U. S. Army photo by Sgt. Luke Rollins).
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In recent years, the security threats facing humanitar ian aid workers have been the subject of 
headlines and debates. The humanitar ian advocacy community has been filled with discussions of 
a perceived increase in the politicization of humanitar ian aid—attr ibuted in par t to declining re-
spect for the humanitar ian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence—and 
growing difficulties ensuring operations can be conducted in accordance with those principles. 
These discussions frequently highlight attacks on relief personnel and assets to show that humani-
tar ian workers are under attack. In the past year, the focus has narrowed to a par ticular area of 
humanitar ian operations: medical and health care personnel and infrastructure. The image is of an 
increasing vulnerability for health care providers in countr ies affected by conf lict. 
The past year has seen a series of alarming reports on the dangers faced by health workers in some 
countr ies. In nor thern Afghanistan, health workers were reportedly in retreat after kill ings of aid 
staff. In Pakistan, polio workers have been targeted with violence. And in Somalia, Medecins sans 
Frontieres (MSF) withdrew citing violence against its staff. 
Subsequent media coverage of these events has painted a picture of a global cr isis in health care 
assistance. Under the headline “Violent Attacks on Health Care Workers a Growing Problem,” one 
writer asser ted that “recent reports of violence targeting health care workers provide evidence 
that the prohibition of violence against health care workers has degraded.” Another insisted that 
“as conf licts around the world multiply and drag on, the respect once accorded to humanitar ian 
workers is eroding. Medical personnel are par ticularly vulnerable.” Accordingly, the “interna-
tional community” is called upon “to make violence against health care workers in conf lict zones 
a priority.”  
Despite the depiction of a growing crisis, historically, attacks on humanitar ian workers and the 
politicization of medical assistance in war zones are not new developments. Yet the media cover-
age of dead and injured medical relief workers, ambulance drivers and vaccination campaigners 
appears to suggest that this practice is getting worse and that the “sanctity of the untouchable 
status of health care” afforded to it under international humanitar ian law “has been eroded, leav-
ing medical workers increasingly vulnerable to attacks.”  
In assessing the two aspects of this claim—violence and politicization—what becomes clear is 
that the trend does appear to be worsening, but only in some contexts. Moreover, even for those 
countr ies where targeted violence is r ising, while the cause might be broadly attr ibuted to politi-
cization, how it manifests and the extent to which it represents a change varies. As such, available 
information challenges suggestions of a global shift in the increasing r isks and vulnerability of 
health care workers. The underlying significance of attacks on health care workers and facilities, 
targeted or otherwise, is not that they may violate the international protections or “sanctity” 
afforded to medical assistance but the consequences such violence has for the conf lict-affected 
populations. As such, this debate raises a more important and much more complex question in 
terms of global trends that requires greater attention: Are the costs of conf lict now greater for 
affected populations, par ticularly when it comes to health? 
BY HANNAH VAUGHAN-LEE
AID UNDER FIRE: HEALTH CARE AND 
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT
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IS VIOLENCE RISING?
A recent article in the Lancet medical journal on the dangers of providing health care in conflict noted 
that “sometimes the level of violence aimed at health care workers—irrespective of how neutral they 
are—means that providing humanitarian aid can become untenable.” The article cited what has become 
a commonly used example of the consequences of the increasingly volatile and potentially “untenable” 
circumstances of medical assistance in conflict-affected countries: the August 2013 withdrawal of 
MSF from Somalia after 22 years of operation in the country. During the two decades of operation, 16 
staff members were killed, and several others were kidnapped or injured in attacks. According to the 
Aid Worker Security Database (ASWD), since 1997, at least 161 aid workers were killed in Somalia. 
Some of these certainly worked with medical organizations, including MSF, and some may have been 
targeted for providing health care, but available information does not indicate that a specific relief 
sector in Somalia was increasingly intentionally targeted. 
Operating in war zones has always come with r isks. Initially, attention focused on the general 
r isks associated with operating in conf lict-affected areas, such as being caught in the crossfire. 
More recently this attention has shifted to targeted violence. When MSF reached its “limit” in 
2013 and withdrew from Somalia, it was a strong symbol in the debate over the limits of what is 
acceptable or tenable for humanitar ian organizations providing assistance in war zones. But it is 
not immediately clear that MSF’s decision to withdraw is representative of a wider trend in which 
medical assistance, in par ticular, is being targeted. 
Targeted attacks on humanitar ian workers, including those providing medical assistance, have a 
history as long as the modern humanitar ian movement, which is commonly regarded as beginning 
with the response to the war and famine in Biafra, Nigeria, in the 1960s. In 1969 three Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief workers were killed when the Nigerian military 
shot down an ICRC aircraft fully marked with the Red Cross emblem and carrying relief aid to 
Biafra. Many other medical workers have been targeted since then. In 1996, six ICRC workers were 
shot dead while sleeping in a hospital in Chechnya—at the time, it was the bloodiest attack on aid 
workers in the ICRC’s 130-year history. In 2001, six ICRC staff members were brutally killed, this 
time in the Democratic Republic of Congo while traveling in two vehicles marked with the Red 
Cross emblem. In 2004, f ive MSF staff members were killed in an ambush in Afghanistan. 
In the past 40 years, the movement has expanded not just in the size of its personnel and assets but 
also in scope, extending “its reach and ambitions into types of conf lict and crisis that were previ-
ously off-limits.” It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the sheer numbers of attacks have also 
increased. Yet recent headlines highlighting attacks on humanitar ian health care workers in South 
Sudan, Syria, Pakistan and Somalia suggest something new in the pattern of targeted violence. 
While there is a scarcity of comprehensive data on this question, there are two sources we can turn 
to for more insight: the ASWD and the ICRC-led Healthcare in Danger project. 
The ASWD is one of the most commonly cited data sources in the discourse on attacks on hu-
manitar ians. The database records “major incidents,” defined as “killings, kidnappings and armed 
attacks that result in serious injury” affecting international and local staff of the United Nations 
international and local nongovernmental organizations as well as the Red Cross/Crescent Move-
ment. At first glance, the ASWD statistics appear to support a global trend of r ising security 
incidents involving aid workers, with an annual average of 147 incidents in 2006-2013, compared 
with an annual average of 64 incidents in 2000-2005. However, the vast majority of the 2006-
2013 incidents were concentrated in 10 countr ies, with the top three—Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Sudan—accounting for more than 50 percent of all incidents during this period. Afghanistan is the 
leader for most of the years, accounting for 30 percent of all incidents between 2006 and 2013 and 
47 percent of all incidents in 2013 alone. The ASWD does not break down the data by function, so 
looking for specific trends related to humanitar ian health care providers from this dataset is dif-
ficult. But one thing is clear: It is more appropriate to speak about trends in a handful of specific 
countr ies than a global trend. 
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Aiming to raise awareness of how medical assistance is targeted in conf lict-affected countr ies, 
the Health Care in Danger project, spanning 2011-2015, collects information on incidents involv-
ing the “use or threat of violence against health care personnel, the wounded and the sick, health 
care facilities and medical vehicles.” Incidents are defined more broadly in this study, which also 
includes local health care workers in addition to those working for the institutions covered by the 
ASWD. However, the findings stil l ref lect the principal observation above—that the majority of 
incidents take place in a handful of countr ies. For example, in 2012, the study recorded 921 violent 
incidents affecting health care in 22 countr ies; these incidents were concentrated in eight coun-
tr ies that each recorded 40 or more incidents. Unfor tunately, the Health Care in Danger study does 
not name the countr ies, but considering news coverage of incidents and available public data it 
would be reasonable to assume that there is some overlap with the ASWD top 10. The ICRC study 
also indicates variation by country as to the perpetrators of these attacks. For example, in one 
country, 80 percent of the incidents were reported as perpetrated by state security forces, while in 
another, armed nonstate actors were reportedly responsible for 52 percent of the incidents. Other 
incidents involve individuals, such as relatives unhappy with patient treatment, and international 
military or police, while stil l others involve multiple perpetrators or lack sufficient information 
to attr ibute responsibility. 
Given the localization of the trend, the question becomes, in countr ies where there is an increase 
of violent incidents involving humanitar ian medical personnel and assets, are they being specifi-
cally targeted because they are providing medical services? Moreover, are there common patterns 
to be found in the motivations for or drivers of these attacks? For example, there does appear to be 
a trend targeting polio vaccination workers in some countr ies, par ticularly Pakistan, Nigeria and 
Afghanistan. The motivations for these attacks can vary, however, with examples including accusa-
tions that polio workers are U.S. spies, the use of attacks against vaccination campaigns to gain 
or increase visibility and beliefs in some communities that vaccination effor ts are actually par t 
of a ster ilization campaign. Though these motivations are context-specific, they can be broadly 
captured under a common theme: politicization. 
In the past decade, there has been a shift away from debates emphasizing the impact of aid on 
politics to that of politics on aid. But while “politicization” is commonly bandied about as a main 
cause of the supposedly increasing vulnerability of assistance in times of conf lict, including medi-
cal assistance, it too is not a new development. Like incidents of violence, politicization spans the 
history of the modern humanitar ian movement. So what, if anything, has changed? 
OLD STORY, NEW NUANCE 
The shooting down of the ICRC plane in 1969, noted above, was in par t the result of the role 
that humanitar ian aid played in sustaining the separatist regime in Biafra and the Nigerian gov-
ernment’s response. Discussions around the political effects of humanitar ian assistance—direct, 
indirect, intended and unintended—at first emerged quietly following the Biafra War and later ex-
ploded in the wake of cr ises such as Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s with the widespread 
recognition that aid could become entangled in the dynamics of war. 
The impact of humanitar ian assistance on political groups and structures or the politicization of 
aid, in which assistance is deliberately manipulated to serve political purposes, can take many 
forms. For example, aid may serve as a f inancial resource for the state or armed nonstate actors 
to sustain or fuel conf lict. It may legitimize armed nonstate actors as an unintended consequence 
of access negotiations or providing services in areas under their control. Or political actors may 
deliberately and directly co-opt humanitar ian action, such as by using humanitar ian assistance as 
a reward for peacebuilding or strategically in military campaigns, including relying on or prevent-
ing access to assistance. 
Syria and Somalia have both recently appeared in headlines citing the increased vulnerability of 
medical assistance in conf lict. Somalia has a 40-year legacy of humanitar ian politics, while Syria 
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is a recent entrant into the fray. Yet they are both examples of how medical assistance can be 
politicized and consciously made par t of military strategy. 
In Syria, the role of medical assistance in military strategy has come front and center since the 
war broke out in 2011. The country is a recent addition (2012) to the ASWD top-10 list, yet news 
reports tell us that among the dead are ambulance crew volunteers, doctors and, as of January 
2014, 34 Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers. In September 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
published a report raising alarm at the “deliberate targeting of hospitals, medical personnel and 
transports, the denial of access to medical care and ill-treatment of the sick and wounded.” The 
report continued, “The denial of medical care as a weapon of war is a distinct and chilling real-
ity of the war in Syria.” That it is “chilling” is by no means in question, but is it new? Or more 
specifically, does it represent a new pattern in conf lict modalities?  
The case of Somalia, where over the decades assistance has been entangled in the politics of the 
conf lict in almost every conceivable way, including military strategies, suggests the answer is no. 
For example, since the 1980s, refugee camps have served as recruiting grounds for the govern-
ment and armed nonstate actors, and warlords and other armed actors have benefit ted from—and 
sometimes consciously sought out—the financial support and legitimacy afforded as an unintended 
consequence of humanitar ian aid. More recently, access to medical assistance has formed par t of 
the military strategy of the principal armed nonstate actor in the conf lict, al-Shabab. It has been 
reported that al-Shabab made an effor t to have international NGOs working in the health sector 
operate in areas under its control in order “to guarantee that its wounded fighters would get ad-
equate treatment.” 
The significance of this medical support did not go unnoticed by either Somalis or international 
observers. And while some NGOs providing medical assistance were expelled from Shabab-con-
trolled areas following accusations of spying for the U.S., other medical humanitar ian agencies re-
mained. One of those organizations was MSF, which has been relatively open about its operations 
in Shabab-controlled areas. Speaking in 2010 about an MSF-supported hospital in the capital, 
Mogadishu, an MSF spokesperson remarked how “from the rebels’ point of view, it was in their 
interest to support assistance for their wounded and displaced populations and to encourage the 
aid organizations to attest to the cr imes by the Ethiopian army with the support of the government 
militias. . . . We are sometimes seen by some political players, the African Union mission officers, 
for example, as the opposition’s war surgeons.”
Some actors were reportedly frustrated by the support they perceived MSF to be providing to 
al-Shabab, which may have made the organization more vulnerable to attack. Yet although the 
Mogadishu hospital mentioned above was hit by gunfire and shelling in 2012, the incident came 
amid renewed fighting in the capital; available evidence does not suggest the hospital or health 
care workers were specifically singled out. Medical personnel and facilities may have been subject 
to violent threats and attacks during the course of the conf lict, but violent targeting of medical 
staff and facilities because of the medical services they provided does not appear to have formed 
an explicit par t of the military strategy—and cer tainly not to the extent witnessed in Syria. 
When MSF pulled out of Somalia in 2013, the decision was based on the culmination of events 
over several years as well as recent incidents. One of those recent incidents was the 2011 killing 
of two staff in Mogadishu. While in no way trying to diminish the seriousness of this incident, 
the killing was reportedly motivated by a human resource grievance, not because of the medical 
services the staff were providing. 
NEW COSTS OF CONFLICT
While both Syria and Somalia provide evidence of medical assistance being instrumentalized in 
war, the cases offer different answers to the question of whether there is an increasing vulner-
ability for humanitar ian health care workers and the assistance they provide. In Syria the answer 
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is clearly yes. In Somalia, it is much less clear. These admittedly brief examples reinforce the need 
to pause before concluding there is a global shift underway in the r isks to health care providers 
in conf lict. 
But what if we look at the issue another way—rather than r ising r isks to health workers, examining 
instead the r ising costs for the conf lict-affected populations’ health in these countr ies. That is, the 
perceived r ise in threats to health workers may be a symptom of a larger phenomenon, that of the 
r ising health costs of conf lict overall, which leave health systems par ticularly damaged. 
Chronic conf lict and state failure in Somalia, and the accompanying political, economic, social 
and security challenges, have left the country with 0.4 doctors for 10,000 inhabitants—compared 
with an average of 28.7 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants for the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council. In the year before MSF pulled out of Somalia, the organization had provided 
more than 624,000 medical consultations, admitted 41,100 patients to hospitals, cared for 30,090 
malnourished children, vaccinated 58,620 people and delivered 7,300 babies. Other NGOs have 
tr ied to fil l the void left by the organization’s withdrawal. But in a country where MSF had become 
one of the main health care providers, it is a big role to fil l. 
We see similar f igures for health care workers in some of the other ASWD top contenders, most 
of which are also countr ies affected by chronic conf lict: In Afghanistan there are 1.9 doctors per 
10,000 inhabitants, while in Sudan there are 2.8. While the duration of the conf lict does not match 
that of Afghanistan or Somalia, the public health sector in Syria already lies in rubble. Conf lict 
has a devastating effect on the health of a population. Contemporary conf licts include battle-
related deaths and injuries, as Syria has il lustrated with estimates of more than 140,000 civilians 
killed to date. But they also include extensive indirect effects of war on health, which can lead 
to death tolls in the millions from disease, malnutr ition and the inability to access medical care.  
Humanitar ian medical assistance in conf lict-affected countr ies provides vital assistance both for 
battle-related injuries as well as the indirect health effects stemming from the destruction of 
public health sector, epidemics accompanying mass population movements, and restr icted or no 
access to basic services such as water, to name only a few. A recent MSF study on health care in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo observed, “Violence, or the threat of it, forces medical staff to 
f lee and health facilities to suspend activities. Often, people in the affected areas have no other 
health care providers to turn to—and it is those people who suffer most.” The inference from the 
debate on violence against health care workers and the politicization of humanitar ian medical as-
sistance is that the health of conf lict-affected populations is becoming more vulnerable, and that 
people are suffering more, as a result. 
A lesson from an earlier round of debate on humanitar ian politics comes to mind here. When 
the political effects of aid came under heavy scrutiny in the 1990s, case studies from Somalia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan were heavily inf luential in what became a 
generalized discussion on how aid fueled conf lict. That aid has unintended effects and could fuel 
conf lict was not and has not been disputed. However, arguably, when taking into consideration the 
many factors that fuel and inf luence conf lict, the significance of aid varies extensively between 
contexts. The “new or thodoxy” of aid fueling war may have been too reliant on a generalization 
based on extreme or outlying cases. 
Within the current discourse on the r isks to health care in conf lict, not only is there a strong 
focus on a specific set of countr ies, but much of the available information on so-called new trends 
focuses on the health care providers rather than a thorough analysis of the effects violence has 
on affected populations. Understanding context-specific patterns of violence against medical as-
sistance is important, and opportunities should not be missed to identify and learn lessons that 
could diminish these attacks. But in terms of global trends, the focus on allegedly growing attacks 
on medical assistance or changes in how it is politically instrumentalized seems to be misplaced. 
The evidence suggests potentially more important questions: Are the effects of conf lict on health 
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care greater than they once were? And why? These are difficult questions, and understanding what 
inf luences the health of a population is a complex endeavor. But the answers may provide greater 
insight into the changing vulnerabilities of health in conf lict. □
Dr. Hannah Vaughan-Lee has more than 10 years experience working on conf lict-af fected coun-
tries with humanitarian, human rights and development organizations. She holds a Ph. D. in 
Development Studies focusing on the politics of aid. Previous articles on aid worker security and 
politicization include “Risks and Compromises for Aid Workers: When is Enough, Enough?” and 
“Humanitarian Space in Somalia: A Scare Commodity.”
Photo: Haitians receiving cholera treatment, L’Estere, Haiti, Oct. 26, 2010 (U. N. photo by Sophia 
Paris).
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There is not sufficient evidence on the use of sexual violence in conf lict to determine whether 
it is increasing or decreasing in prevalence or institutionalization. However, evidence indicates 
it is widespread. Conf lict-related gendered violence can range from a tool of economic exploita-
tion, oppression and violence, especially during conf licts, disasters and their aftermath, to the 
systematic use of sexual violence as a strategy in armed conf lict. Gender-based violence (GBV) 
is defined in humanitar ian contexts as “an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated 
against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males 
and females.”
Many conf licts encompass different formsof GBV, the escalation of which is fueled by pre-existing 
gender inequalities, discrimination, abuse and lack of respect of human r ights. Despite common 
assumptions, gendered violence in conf lict is not l imited to women and girls, but can also target 
men and boys, as well as persons of all ages. There is evidence of widespread use of sexual vio-
lence in contemporary conf licts, including in Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Syria, Colombia, Guatemala 
and Honduras, and including against men, for example in Syria and the eastern Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo.
Despite the prevalence of sexual violence in conf lict today, we are no longer living in an era of si-
lence and impunity. This changed definitively when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) came into force in 2002. Building on previous international cr iminal tr ibunals, the 
ICC expands international law on war cr imes and crimes against humanity to encompass forms of 
sexual violence such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced 
ster ilization, and also to consider sexual violence as an element of genocide. These developments 
have challenged prevailing norms that treated sexual violence in warfare as a corollary to looting, 
in which the woman was seen as the proper ty of another man, rather than in terms of her own 
bodily integrity and human dignity.
Never theless, the r isks of sexual violence are also shifting along with changes in the patterns 
of conf lict and the spaces in which it takes place. This requires new kinds of programming to 
support affected members of communities. Of par ticular note, refugee and displaced populations 
are becoming more urban as opposed to rural, while localized violence is also increasingly inter-
twined with cr ime and economic exploitation embedded in globalized networks. Climate change 
and disaster also intersect with cr ime and conf lict to fur ther heighten r isks.
CONFLICT TRENDS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Despite major shifts in the global patterns of warfare over the past century, more than 1.5 billion 
people currently live in areas affected by state fragility from the intersections of violence, cr ime 
and conf lict. Contemporary conf licts are also internationalized through the blurr ing of il l icit and 
licit economies, or what Carolyn Nordstrom calls the “extralegal” movement of goods and people. 
As Reece Jones has documented in “Border Walls,” states are increasingly walling up their borders 
to fur ther militar ize control of extralegal activity—for purposes of both profit and interdiction—
and as par t of their strategies to limit asylum seekers and facilitate deportation. 
BY JANIE LEATHERMAN AND NADEZDA 
GRIFFIN
UNSAFE SPACES: TRENDS AND 
CHALLENGES IN GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE
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These developments in state border practices have to be seen against the backdrop of historic 
highs in numbers of displaced people along with four related trends. First, the balance of refugees 
is shifting from rural camp settings to urban locations. Second, threats of human displacement 
from climate change are r ising, with related potential for environmentally driven conf licts around 
the world and elevated gendered vulnerabilities. At the same time, rapid urbanization is also pro-
jected to greatly enhance exposure to disaster r isks. Third, the interface between migration and 
humanitar ian cr ises is producing “mixed migration.” And four th, the numbers of stateless people 
are high—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees identified 3.5 million stateless per-
sons in 64 countr ies in 2012, but estimates that there may be over 12 million stateless worldwide. 
All these trends heighten the vulnerability of displaced populations, including through the r ising 
numbers of unaccompanied minors, to the r isks of GBV and exploitation.
These shifts create new spaces for GBV that need to be addressed. For example, the shift of 
refugee populations from rural camps to urban settings introduces different security and safety 
challenges. In camp settings, women refugees and displaced persons face such r isks as limited 
camp monitoring for security; i l l-considered placement of latr ines along with lack of lighting and 
locks; absence of male family or community members to provide protection; and r isks of sexual 
assault while collecting firewood or selling goods at the local market, among others. Along with 
rape by gangs, rebel groups, government armed forces, local police or even humanitar ian workers, 
survival sex poses some of the greatest gendered r isks. Indeed, some women refugees in Mafraq, 
Jordan, who had f led Syria indicated that they knew of cases where sex had to be exchanged for 
aid. Humanitar ian programming should provide equal access to economic opportunities for men 
and women, and ensure safety consistent with the principle of “do no harm.” But for women, these 
opportunities may in fact be limited.
In urban settings, the displaced are often unregistered and undocumented refugees who lack r ights 
and face persecution. While they may attempt to blend into the local setting, refugees face gen-
dered r isks from inadequate shelter, physical insecurity and exploitation in informal markets—for 
women especially in domestic labor or prostitution. In urban settings and post-disaster contexts, 
vulnerabilities to human and sex trafficking increase, including for children, especially as dis-
placement destroys livelihoods and people are forced to find new means to support their families. 
Conf licts unfold both over time and space. The post-Cold War approach to conf lict interventions 
has been driven by a phase model of conf lict, with programming geared to challenges ar ising over 
a timeline defined as pre-crisis, cr isis and stabilization/recovery—a framework clearly ar ticulated, 
for example, in the 2010 “Handbook for Coordinating Gender-based Violence Interventions in 
Humanitar ian Settings.” However, local conf licts are often linked to global political economies of 
violence. A spatial analysis can help GBV programming by illustrating the patterns and scale of 
these r isks and enabling factors, determining where these occur in the daily lives and livelihoods 
of those most vulnerable and identifying options to enhance gendered safety.
For example, displaced populations settl ing in camps for refugees or the internally displaced 
integrating into an urban environment may find themselves in less of a “community” context than 
they would in traditional villages. While this makes it possible to report cases of GBV in a more 
anonymous way, the lack of community also makes it more difficult to encourage local support and 
incorporate local and culturally accepted practices into healing GBV-related trauma. Therefore, 
programs may consider creating communities of survivors and those working with them to enable 
support and long-term economic opportunities, rather than relying on geographically oriented 
communities as a support structure. Survival Girls, a theater group for Congolese girls aged 17-22 
in Nairobi’s slum of Kangemi, is a safe space that serves such purposes.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A CONFLICT WEAPON
Sexual violence is an affront to humanity, r ipping apar t bodies, families and communities. The im-
pact of any possible form of assistance to survivors pales in contrast to the trail of destruction left 
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in the wake of sexual violence. Sexual violence casts a long shadow over its victims—whether men, 
women, war orphans, rape babies or child soldiers—through physical and psychological trauma and 
social mechanisms of exclusion, shame, stigmatization and blame. Reverberations endure through 
subsequent generations by means of the transmission of trauma, the long arc of war memories and 
the shunning and marginalization of affected families and community members. In conf licts such 
as the genocide in Rwanda and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, rape has been used as a weapon of 
war to block as much as possible any future for the enemy.
Historically, strong taboos have created a veil of silence about the role of sexual violence in 
peacetime and war. The global women’s movement that gained momentum in the 1990s began to 
empower women to overcome this silencing. As evidenced by key United Nations Security Council 
resolutions such as 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2012) 
and 2122 (2013), along with other U.N. reports, such as the 2012 U.N. secretary-general’s report 
on conf lict-related sexual violence, most of the attention has focused on violence against women 
and girls. Yet male victimization has been documented in a vast ar ray of conf licts, most recently 
in Syria, even if the extent of it is only slowly coming to light. 
Sexual violence is a “runaway” norm that intensifies social harm through many overlapping and 
egregious subversive strategies and practices. It is also a pervasive element of conf lict, posing r isks 
through all phases of conf lict. Risks for women and children’s safety in the aftermath of conf lict 
remain high, too, because of the breakdown of social norms, a climate of impunity, a culture of 
violence against women in both domestic and public spheres, a collapse of law and public authority 
and the resulting lack of accountability, increased banditry and criminality, and retr ibution.
Sexual violence is efficient because it is a cheap, practically inexhaustible weapon that can be 
used to simultaneously cross numerous thresholds of violence. It is also a powerful weapon for 
cultural reasons related to its force as a taboo violation. Sexual violence encompasses atrocities 
that subver t the traditional social order and elevate horror. 
There are at least four elements that help explain the par ticular viciousness of sexual violence. The 
first aspect concerns the egregious forms or acts of violence that sexual assaults entail. As more 
thresholds are broken, it seems that perpetrators pursue increasingly depraved forms of sexual 
violence and combinations of them in an attempt to continuously escalate the threat.
A second aspect of sexual violence as a runaway norm concerns the targets of the violence, es-
pecially victims with special standing in society, such as pregnant women, the elderly, children, 
mothers, fathers, grandparents, doctors, nurses, teachers and religious leaders. A third element 
that propels the runaway normative character of sexual violence concerns the use of forced agency, 
such as children who are compelled to commit acts of sexual violence, and child soldiers—many 
of whom may have themselves been abducted—who are drugged or indoctr inated to carry out war 
cr imes and crimes against humanity. 
A four th characteristic that fuels sexual violence as a runaway norm concerns the place where it is 
committed, which is almost always significant in its own way. This point also underscores the im-
portance of understanding the spatiality of sexual violence in conf lict as perhaps an incomparable 
weapon—and a force multiplier—for the production of unsafe space. It is used to threaten com-
munities and drive community members to f lee violence, while placing them at new risk. This in 
turn enables opposing armed groups to capture the abandoned ter r itory and assets, control access 
to them and use displaced and vulnerable populations for forced labor—including for smuggling 
arms, drug production and trafficking, mining and other activities.
Sexual violence in conf licts occurs in all manner of locations, including in homes, gardens and 
fields, as well as at work and in many places considered safe havens, such as hospitals, clinics, 
schools and religious sites. It also occurs in refugee or internally displaced person camps. In 
many instances, sexual violence in armed conf lict appears not to be systematically organized at 
W
PR
 F
EA
TU
R
E
W
PR
 F
EA
TU
R
E
18WPR | FIRST RESPONSE: HEALTH WORK IN CONFLICT ZONES 2014
the highest levels nor limited to individual acts of ter ror. Rather, it occurs somewhere along such 
a continuum as par t of local strategies of control, exploitation and domination, such as reports 
suggest is the case in Syria.
CURRENT AND FUTURE POLICY DIRECTIONS
The programs addressing GBV-related issues typically involve coordination, response and, to some 
extent, attempts at prevention. Such programs are integrated or addressed through a number of sec-
tors, including health, rule of law, food security and livelihoods, education and so on. Stakeholders 
in the area of GBV-related issues range from international organizations such as the U.N. Security 
Council, the International Criminal Court, the U.N. Depar tment of Peacekeeping Operations and 
the U.N. Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conf lict, to regional organizations, such 
as the African Union, governments—including relevant ministr ies, such as for health—and to 
regional and local municipalities and community-based organizations. 
The United Nations Children Fund and the United Nations Populations Fund are the lead agencies 
for the GBV area of responsibility within the interagency Global Protection Cluster, while U.N. 
Women spearheads international initiatives on women, peace and security, gender equality and 
development work. Governments have elaborated national action plans (NAPs) on women, peace 
and security, many of which the Network of Women Peacebuilders monitors and reports on in its 
annual publication “Women Count.” NAPs are also tracked on Peace Women. In addition, some 
countr ies have developed special programming on violence against women. The United States, 
for example, has launched a program under the Secretary of State’s Office of Global Women’s 
Issues, and the British government has done so under its Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative. 
International nongovernmental organizations working in the field of GBV include agencies such 
as the International Rescue Committee, the American Refugee Committee, Save the Children, 
International Medical Corps, Oxfam, Handicap International and Plan International. 
As set for th by the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines, GBV programs typically 
focus on the needs of the survivor, providing medical, psychosocial, legal, economic and social 
resources. In order to reduce GBV cases, most programs include advocacy and training effor ts, 
thus encouraging governments to create adequate GBV-related policies, educating communities 
about the cases occurring in their localities and sharing the impact on the victims in hopes of 
reducing the number of cases. Yet the existing stigma when it comes to reporting GBV often im-
pedes those effor ts. For instance, a 2013 Interagency Assessment report on child protection among 
Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates that there is very limited awareness about services available to 
victims of GBV. It is generally accepted that GBV cases are underreported, while the full scale of 
it is unknown. According to the same report, 83 percent of those asked were not aware of services 
offered in their communities. 
Meanwhile, some countr ies do have policies to combat GBV and are aware of a multitude of GBV 
cases, but the enforcement of those policies remains a challenge. Victims or their families may 
report GBV cases in a variety of ways—such as through family, medical professionals or law en-
forcement—but in a number of instances the victim is fur ther victimized by the resulting process. 
For example, a rape victim may be forced to marry the perpetrator, blamed for the violence that 
occurred or forced to remain in marriage for the sake of family stability. In addition to widespread 
problems with impunity, the 2012 “Women Count” report also revealed a lack of health care ser-
vices and capacity and a lack of gender-sensitive resources for the police and judicial systems. 
As data from numerous reports on the substantial numbers of sexual violence victims among 
men and boys ref lect—including recent reports from Syria—there is also space for adjusting in-
terventions to develop awareness of physical symptoms of sexual assault of male victims and to 
destigmatize the reporting of such violations. There also need to be medical and psychosocial 
programs and longer-term economic solutions to support men and aid them in recovery, including 
within family and community support structures. Prevention, monitoring and advocacy programs 
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need also to consider the r isk factors and causes that predispose men and boys to sexual violence 
in contemporary conf licts, including in the context of state fragility and the linkages between 
conf lict and crime.
A range of programs consider GBV in conjunction with the safe space issue. In considering shelter 
or construction programs, these approaches may involve building the camp so that families are 
given relative privacy and so that single, widowed or separated women are not exposed to greater 
r isk when they have to take on more responsibilities for the household and—when possible—for 
generating income. In other instances, projects may include improving the safety of the actual 
shelters. Similarly, the programs that focus on economic strengthening, including those with vari-
ous training programs, income-generation activities, cash transfers, grants, agricultural develop-
ment and so on, may consider GBV problematic in the design and implementation of those projects, 
while other projects specifically target GBV survivors. The failure to do so ref lects widely held 
assumptions that economic recovery and infrastructure are gender-neutral, that is, that women and 
men will benefit equally, though that is rarely the case.
There are many large international nonprofit organizations leading GBV programs around the 
world in conf lict, post-conf lict or relative peace environments. To date, there is no complete 
overview of the scale of such programs, though more country-level information may be available 
via the protection cluster in the locations where it is established. However, this overview often 
does not take into consideration a substantial number of local, community initiatives and organiza-
tions that often have limited visibility and funding and yet provide important services to women 
and girls in those communities. For instance, a Southern Sudanese NGO, Confident Children out 
of Conf lict (CCC), provides a safe space for girls that are at high r isk of exploitation and abuse, 
including GBV. CCC provides a safe place to stay along with access to basic education and voca-
tional training. The binational Kino Border Initiative in Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales in the state 
of Sonora, Mexico, similarly provides safe space in a region of violent border r isks for migrants 
deported from the United States, including a safe house for women f leeing domestic and drug-
related violence from Central America and Mexico.
While the field of GBV programming in humanitar ian emergencies has developed rapidly over 
the past decade within and across many sectors, methods of evaluating effectiveness and evidence 
of learning from good practices are emerging more slowly.  Such learning has been propelled 
by organizations such as The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in 
Humanitar ian Action, founded in 1997, and DARA, founded in 2003, which both aim to improve 
quality and effectiveness of humanitar ian action. Nonetheless, in the present context it is difficult 
to pinpoint to what extent the currently implemented programs would help prevent gender-based 
violence. Moreover, given the number of potentially underreported cases it is hard to identify the 
depth of the problem, and yet making assistance available is cr itical in emergencies. However, go-
ing forward, integrating GBV programs into the community is essential in preventing GBV cases. 
Eventually, community-based effor ts can be fur ther developed into larger civil society impacts 
with the involvement of women’s organizations for effective monitoring, and also mobilizing and 
advocating for policy implementation. 
To such ends, a key initiative is the 2014 pilot of revisions to the 2005 IASC Guidelines, which 
will be followed by feedback and fur ther refinement. These revisions will stress the importance 
of multifaceted programing on GBV rather than a focus on sexual violence in emergencies, cover 
natural disasters along with conf lict settings, give guidance to both shor t-term programming to 
improve protection as well as interventions for longer-term structural changes to eliminate GBV, 
and include accountability mechanisms. Guidance documents on GBV programming may benefit 
from fur ther categorizing different forms of violence, target groups, contexts and relevant re-
sponses to foster the exchange of lessons learned.
Nonetheless, among the challenges for moving forward is the lack of consensus on defining and ap-
plying gender-based violence concepts. A second issue concerns new demands for programming to 
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support a wider range of survivors, such as men and boys; gay, lesbian and transgendered people; 
and the disabled. A third set of challenges ar ises from changing contexts, such as r isks in urban 
versus rural settings or conf lict versus disaster response and, increasingly, their intersections. 
There are also different challenges for assessing success or failure in r isk prevention or mitigation 
versus outcomes of GBV programing to assist survivors. Prevention strategies are more complex, 
less tangible and more difficult to measure, especially strategies that target structural causes of 
violence, such as programming to address discrimination against women or develop the rule of law 
encompassing women’s r ights. The impact of these strategies on social transformation is long-term 
and complex. In addition, it is difficult to prove counterfactuals, for instance that a par ticular 
preventive measure—such as lighting for latr ines in refugees camps to provide greater protection 
for women—averted specific outcomes, such as a cer tain number of rapes. In contrast, response 
programs can tabulate numbers of persons given medical care, food, water, shelter and so on.
GBV is a widespread “runaway” norm that operates both temporally and spatially. Though no 
longer abetted by silence and impunity, it is in some ways adapting along with shifts in conf lict 
itself. Our effor ts to respond to it, and prevent it, must do so as well. □
Dr. Janie Leatherman is a professor of politics and International studies at Fairf ield University, 
and has served as a consultant on peace and conf lict early warning and prevention, and humani-
tarian education. Her recent publications include “Sexual Violence and Armed Conf lict” (Polity 
2011), “A Safe Space” (Fairf ield Magazine 2013), and “Violencia Sexual, Guerra Globalizada y 
el Colapso de Los Espacios Seguros” (Politai 2012).
Nadezda Grif f in is a humanitarian and development consultant with more than 10 years of experi-
ence in operations and logistics management, most recently with Action Against Hunger.
Photo: A clinic for vicitims of gender-baseded violence in Zambia, Nov. 27, 2012 (U.K. Depart-
ment for International Development photo).
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